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BEQUESTS FOR THE CARE OF SPECIFIC ANIMALS
JAMES T. BRENNAN
I. IN GENERAL
Today bequests including trusts for the performance of religious ser-
vices or for the care of gravesites are universally upheld, either under
common law or specific authorizing statutes. In the few jurisdictions where
such trusts are not regarded as charitable trusts, they are upheld as
honorary trusts. When we turn to the testamentary dedication of property
for the care of specific animals, we find no such general acceptance. Gifts
for the care of specific animals, usually pets of the deceased testatrix, have
been upheld only in England, Ohio and Kentucky, despite the fact that the
scholarly literature in general favors the validity of such bequests.' Two
rules of law have lead the American courts generally to hold such bequests
invalid. They are the requirement that a trust have a human beneficiary
and the rule against perpetuities. Of the two, the lack of a human benefi-
ciary capable of enforcing the bequest is most significant. Even cases
decided on the basis of the rule against perpetuities often declare the rule
violated because the rule is defined in terms of human lives.2 It should be
noted that the cases perhaps most directly in point are the cases involving
bequests to slaves prior to the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thir-
teenth Amendment. However, these cases have not been cited by the
courts in discussing the validity of bequests for the care of specific ani-
mals.' Nor are the cases involving bequests for religious services or the
erection or maintenance of grave monuments frequently cited in the
American cases involving the validity of bequests for the care of specific
animals.
1. In addition to Scott and Bogart's Treatises on Trusts, the following secondary litera-
ture deals with bequests for the care of specific animals: Wolfe, Honorary Trust in Pennsyl-
vania, 42 DIcK. L. REV. 161 (1938); Smith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 30 CoLUM. L. REV. 60 (1930); Clark, Unenforcible Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 10 MIcH. L. REV. 31 (1911); Gray, Gifts for a Non-Charitable
Purpose, 15 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1902); Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust, 5 HARV. L.
REV. 389 (1892) ; Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 PA. L. REV. 527 (1917) ; Note,
42 YALE L.J. 1290 (1933); Note, 17 MsNN. L. REV. 563 (1933); Note, 46 HARV. L. REV.
1036 (1933); Comment, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 705 (1966). ANNOT., 66 A.L.R. 465 (1930);
ANNOT., 73 A.L.R.2d 1032 at 1043 (1960); ANNOT., 31 A.L.R. 430 (1924).
2. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374, Comment h (1944) states:
The lives which can be used in measuring the permissible period under the rule
against perpetuities must be lives of human beings. For many purposes in the law a
corporation is a "person," but not for the measurement of the period described in
Clause (a). So also no such measurement may be expressed in terms of the life of
any animal (other than man), even though the animal t is one of a type having a life
span typically shorter than that of human beings, as for example, a dog or a horse.
3. See discussion in Gray, Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose, 15 HARV. L. REV. 509
(1902); American Colonization Society v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448 (1857).
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II. THE ENGLISH LAW
A. Honorary Trusts
Attorney-General v. Whorwood4 is generally regarded as the first
English case involving the validity of bequests for the care of specific
animals because of its often quoted dicta:
When a man will settle his estate in this odd, whimsical way,
the court ought not to establish it: it is locking up property,
which is against the policy of the law of England. (Italics in the
original) The court has refused carrying into execution a par-
ticular turn of mind, though it was not a superstitious or illegal,
but an indifferent use; as to feed sparrows, &c. (Italics sup-
plied), especially as this is for ever.5
The case actually concerned the validity of a devise of the testator's
house to University College, Oxford, for the use of a senior fellow who was
required to be a divine.
The first English case upholding the validity of a bequest for the care of
specific animals was Mitford v. Reynolds.6 Provision 9 of Robert Med-
ford's will read:
Ninthly, I will, devise, give and bequeath the remainder of my
property, of whatever kind and description, and that may arise
from the sale of my effects, after deducting the annual amount
that will be requisite to defray the keep of my horses (which I
will and direct be preserved as pensioners, and are never, under
any plea [ 108] or pretence, to be used, rode or driven, or applied
to labour) to the Government of Bengal, for the express pur-
pose of that Government applying the amount to charitable,
beneficial and public Works at and in the City of Dacca in
Bengal; the intent of such bequest and direction being that the
amount shall be applied exclusively to the benefit of the native
inhabitants, in the manner they and the Government may regard
to be most conducive to that end.
Since Lord Lyndhurst had held the ninth clause valid, the court felt that
it was not at liberty to decide otherwise. It does not appear that the
validity of the provision for Mr. Medford's horses was forcefully
challenged.
The classic case of In re Dean' arose a half century later. Mr. Dean
devised his freehold estates subject to and charged with an annuity of
4. [1750] 1 Ves. Sen. 534.
5. Id. at 536.
6. [1848] 16 Sim. 105, 60 Eng. Rep. 812.
7. [1889] 41 Ch. D. 552.
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£750 for the care of his horses and hounds.' James Cooper who had the
life use of the estates brought the action to have the charge on the estate
in favor of the animals declared invalid or in the alternative for a declara-
tion that he was entitled to any excess of the £750 not required to carry
out the trust for the benefit of the testator's horses and hounds.
The plaintiff presented the classic argument against the validity of the
annuity. He argued that such a gift for specific animals was not a chari-
table gift; 9 that since the trust was not charitable, it failed because there
8. I give to my trustees my eight horses and ponies (excluding cart horses) at
Littledown, and also my hounds in the kennels there. And I charge my said free-
hold estates hereinbefore demised and devised, in priority to all other charges
created by this my will, with the payment to my trustees for the term of fifty years
commencing from my death, if any of the said horses and hounds shall so long live,
of an annual sum of 1 750. And I declare that my trustees shall apply the said
annual sum payable to them under this clause in the maintenance of the said horses
and hounds for the time being living, and in maintaining the stables, kennels, and
buildings now inhabited by the said animals in such condition of repair as my
trustees may deem fit; but this condition shall not imply any obligation on my
trustees to leave the said stables, kennels and buildings in a state of repair at the
determination of the said term; but I declare that my trustees shall not be bound
to render any account of the application or expenditure of the said sum of £ 750,
and any part thereof remaining unapplied shall be dealt with by them at their
sole discretion. And my will is that, so long as there shall remain any of my said
horses, ponies and hounds living, they shall be kept in the stables, kennels and
buildings which they now occupy. And I empower my trustees to recover payment
of the said sum of £ 750 by distress and entry upon and receipt of the rents and
profits of the lands so charged therewith as aforesaid, or any part thereof, when in
arrear for twenty-one days. I declare that the said horses and ponies shall not be
worked after my death, but may at all times be exercised on my freehold property
at the discretion and direction of my trustees, and that neither they nor the said
hounds shall be sold, but that the latter may be used by the person for the time
being entitled to the possession of the settled hereditaments. I direct that whenever
my trustees shall consider that one or any of the said horses and ponies should be
killed, the same shall be shot with a double-barrelled gun, both barrels loaded at the
same time, with clean barrels and a full charge. I bequeath to my trustees for the
term of fifty years above mentioned, if any of the said horses, ponies, or hounds
shall so long live, the cottage and garden now occupied by W. Vatter, and also the
stables, kennels and buildings now occupied by my said horses, ponies, and hounds,
and the yards appurtenant thereto. I bequeath to The Royal Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Animals in London the sum of £ 2000 free of legacy duty, and that
the same and the legacy duty thereon respectively shall be paid exclusively out of
such part of my personal estate as may be legally bequeathed for charitable pur-
poses. In consideration of the maintenance of my horses, ponies and hounds being
a charge upon my said estate as aforesaid, I give all my personal estate not other-
wise disposed of unto the said James Cooper, his heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns absolutely.
Id., at 553.
9. It should be noted that if it were a charitable gift, it would have failed under English
law because an annuity for charitable purposes which was a charge on land was invalid. It
may also be noted that under old New York Real Property Law § 96 (no longer in effect),
and in other states which had or still have this provision of the New York Revised Statutes
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was no cestui que trust capable of enforcing it; and that it was void, as
tending to a perpetuity, since it depended on the lives of animals, not
humans.
The court told counsel that there was no need to even bother arguing
that the gift was not charitable.1" As to the argument that the trust was
void because there was no person capable of enforcing it, the court refused
to adopt this view because of the validity of trusts for the erection"1 or
maintenance of monuments "although it is difficult to say who would be
the cestui que trust [italics in original] of the monument."12 The court
rather obviously considered itself bound by Mitford v. Reynolds and
pointed out that the validity of the bequest in favor of the animals had to
have been passed on in that case because it was the duty of the East Indian
Government to raise the point on behalf of the charity. The court stated
that a sum of £1800 Consols had been set aside for the maintenance of the
horses until their death.
On the issue of whether or not such bequests were against public policy,
the Dean court stated:
Is there then anything illegal or obnoxious to the law in the
nature of the provision, that is, in the fact that it is not for
human beings, but for horses and dogs? It is clearly settled by
authority that a charity may be established for the benefit of
horses and dogs, and, therefore, the making of a provision for
horses and dogs, which is not a charity, cannot of itself be
obnoxious to the law, provided, of course, that it is not to last for
too long a period. 3
The defendant trustees argued that the gift was an absolute and bene-
ficial one to the trustees, coupled with a statement of the testator's motive
for making it. This is a very common argument advanced in the cases in-
volving bequests for the care of specific animals. The court held that the
language of the bequest did not admit to such an interpretation.
As to the rule against perpetuities, in discussing the validity of bequests
for the care of monuments, the court stated:
of 1830, which sets forth the purposes for which an express trust of real property may be
created, such a charge would be invalid.
10. At this time there appears to have been a more hostile judicial attitude toward
charitable bequests than in the case today. Also the English courts may not be as ready to
hold bequests charitable as are the American courts. Footnote 9 supra may be one reason
for this difference in judicial attitude.
11. Mitford v. Reynolds, [1848] 16 Sims 105, 60 Eng. Rep. 812. Clause 8 of the will,
not discussed previously.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
[Vol. 6:15
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In my opinion such a trust would be good, although the testator
must be careful to limit the time for which it is to last, because,
as it is not a charitable trust, unless it is to come to an end within
the limits fixed by the rule against perpetuities, it would be
illegal. 4
Thus the court in In re bean upheld the validity of an annuity for the
benefit of specific animals on the precedent of both clause 8 and clause 9
in Mitford v. Reynolds and the court's opinion that since it is not against
public policy to benefit unknown animals, it is not against public policy to
benefit designated animals. The court did not meet the legal requirements
for a cestui que trust and compliance with the rule against perpetuities
head-on.
The validity of a direction by the testator that his trustees pay to his
wife, so long as she and any of his dogs and horses were alive, for the keep
of his dogs and horses while living and not given away or otherwise dis-
posed of by her three shillings a week for each dog and fifteen shillings
a week for each horse was recognized in In re Hawkins." There the gift
was held subject to reduction for the payment of taxes under the Finance
Act of 1941.16
In In re Thompson 7 a testator bequeathed £1000 to a friend, Mr.
Lloyd, to be applied by him in such manner as he should in his absolute
discretion think fit towards the promotion and furthering of fox hunting.
Mr. Lloyd expressed his willingness to carry out the testator's intention.
In permitting Mr. Lloyd to carry out the trust, the court said:
No argument has been put forward which could justify the
Court in holding this gift to be a gift in favour of charity, al-
though it may well be that a gift for the benefit of animals gen-
erally is a charitable gift: but it seems to me plain that I cannot
construe the object for which this legacy was given as being for
the benefit of animals generally. In my judgment the object of
the gift has been defined with sufficient clearness and is of a
nature to which effect can be given.'"
B. Charitable Trusts
Since a bequest for a specific animal was upheld as a charitable trust
under a Kentucky statute, the English cases concerning whether bequests
for animals constitute a valid charity should be mentioned. In In re Grove-
14. Id. at 557.
15. [1942] 1 Ch. 67.
16. 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 30, § 25 (1941).
17. [1933] 1 Ch. 342.
18. [1934] 1 Ch. 342, 343.
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Grady'9 testatrix established a trust for three purposes. The first purpose
was for the acquisition of land as a game refuge if land could be legally
acquired for that purpose.2' The lower court held that a trust which in-
cluded within its scope animals which were harmful to the human race was
nevertheless a valid charitable trust. The Court of Appeal reversed with
one dissent stating that such a purpose involved no benefit to the com-
munity which was required to make a trust charitable.2 Lord Hansworth
in his opinion stated:
The one characteristic of the refuge is that it is free from the
molestation of man, while all the fauna within it are to be free to
molest and harry one another.
Such a purpose does not, in my opinion, afford any advantage
to animals that are useful to mankind in particular, or any pro-
tection from cruelty to animals generally. It does not denote any
elevating lesson to mankind.22
The purpose of the trust in light of the public policy reasons for exclud-
ing charitable trusts from compliance with the rule against perpetuities
may well have been decisive as Lord Hanworth said:
Plainly, therefore, a very wide interpretation has been given to
the term charity, where the objective is not only the condition of
men, but also of animals; but it is not to be treated as inclusive
of every purpose, which the whim or caprice of a testator may
prescribe. The caution administered by Lord Campbell in
19. [1929] 1 Ch. 557.
20. See n.9, supra.
21. Lord Russell stated:
In my opinion it is not [a charitable trust]. It is merely a trust to secure that all
animals within the area shall be free from molestation or destruction by man. It is
not a trust directed to ensure absence or diminution of pain or cruelty in the
destruction of animal life. If this trust is carried out according to its tenor, no animal
within the area may be destroyed by man no matter how necessary that destruction
may be in the interests of mankind or in the interests of the other denizens of the
area or in the interests of the animal itself; and no matter how painlessly such
destruction may be brought about. It seems to me impossible to say that the carrying
out of such a trust necessarily involves benefit to the public. Beyond perhaps hearing
of the existence of the enclosure the public does not come into the matter at all.
Consistently with the trust the public could be excluded from entering the area or
even looking into it. All that the public need know about the matter would be that
one or more areas existed in which all animals (whether good or bad from man-
kind's point of view) were allowed to live free from any risk of being molested or
killed by man; though liable to be molested and killed by other denizens of the
area. For myself I feel quite unable to say that any benefit to the community will
necessarily result from applying the trust fund to the purposes indicated in the
first object.
In re Grove-Grady, [1929] 1 Ch. 557, 585-86.
22. Id., at 573 and 574.
[Vol. 6:15
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Jefiries v. Alexander23 stands good: "A man has a natural right
to enjoy his property during his life, and to leave it to his chil-
dren at his death, but the liberty to determine how property shall
be enjoyed in saecula saeculorum when he, who was once the
owner of it, is in his grave, and to destine it in perpetuity to any
purposes however fantastical, useless, or ludicrous, so that they
cannot be said to be directly contrary to religion and morality,
is a right and liberty which, I think, cannot be claimed by any
natural or Divine law, and which, I think, ought by human law,
to be strictly watched and regulated." Illustrations of this limita-
tion or restriction are to be found in the cases. I will refer to
A ttorney-General v. Whorwood,2 4 before Lord Hardwicke, where
it is stated that "the Court has refused carrying into execution a
particular turn of mind, though it was not a superstitious or
illegal, but an indifferent use; as to feed sparrows," to Tatham v.
Drummond 5 in which Lord Westbury rejected a gift "towards
the establishment.., of slaughter-houses away from the densely
populated places in which they are now situated, and for the
relief of and protection from cruelty to the animals taken to be
slaughtered." And in In re Wedgwood26 Kennedy, L.J. expresses
the opinion that if the intention was the protection and mainte-
nance of noxious animals, or the preservation of beasts of prey or
mad dogs, the Court would not find any difficulty as to the
answer which is dictated by reason and common sense.2
C. The English Position
The English position on bequests for the care of specific animals is
that they are valid. This decision is based on a common sense determina-
tion that such bequests do not contravene public morality and the public
policy reasons behind the rules of law which require a cestui que trust and
compliance with the rule against perpetuities. As long as the directions of
the testator are sufficiently definite to be carried out, are not frivolous or
capricious, and the trustee is willing to perform the trust, the courts uphold
the bequest. The rule against perpetuities with its devious technicalities
has not been applied to these bequests, yet the courts in dicta indicate
that both the amount of the trust res and the duration must be reasonable.
This is a sensible approach because the rule against perpetuities was
developed under a system of primogeniture to prevent the tying up of
wealth in one family in saecula saeculorum. It would only be truly appli-
cable if a testator attempted to provide for the descendants of a specific
23. [1860] 8 H.L. 594, 648.
24. [1750] 1 Ves. Sen. 534, 536.
25. [1864] 4 De G. J. & S. 484.
26. [1915] 1 Ch. 113, 121.
27. [1929] 1 Ch. 557, 570-71.. (Footnotes are the author's).
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animal as well as for that animal itself. Since the maximum lifespan of all
domestic animals, including the elephant, does not exceed the maximum
lifespan of human beings, there is no need to refuse to permit a trust for
the benefit of a specific animal to be measured by that animal's life. Such
bequests could be drafted to comply with the rule against perpetuities
anyway. However, a human life, probably the caretaker's, plus 21 years is
simply irrelevant to the accomplishment of the purpose of a trust to care
for a specific animal.
III. THE AMERICAN LAW
A. The Restatement of Trusts
The Restatement of Trusts, Second in Section 124 states:
Where the owner of property transfers it in trust for a specific
non-charitable purpose, and there is no definite or definitely
ascertainable beneficiary designated, no enforceable trust is
created; but the transferee has power to apply the property to
the designated purpose, unless such application is authorized or
directed to be made at a time beyond the period of the rule
against perpetuities.
The Restatement thus declares that no trust is created, but rather
merely a power, personal to the donee of the power, is created to apply the
property to the designated purpose. Thus, the intention of the testator may
be frustrated by the donee of the power in his unfettered discretion. The
English courts have not passed on the point whether or not they would
order a trustee to perform or appoint another trustee to carry out the
testator's purpose. It would seem that if bequests for the care of specific
animals are not contrary to public policy, the performance of such a
direction should not be within the discretion of the "trustee." The tes-
tator's intention should be enforced by the courts. A true trust rather than
a personal power of appointment should be held to exist.
Both the English courts and the Restatement agree that the specific
non-charitable purpose should not be capricious. Neither the English
courts nor the Restatement specifically declare that the amount dedicated
to the specific purpose must be reasonable either in light of the social
utility of the specific purpose or the amount which would be reasonably
required to accomplish the specific purpose. As applied to the care of
specific animals, the only real problem is the overfunding of such a trust
as occurred in In re McNeill's Estate2" where a residue of over $300,000
was left in trust for three animals for life. At 4% interest this would have
provided an annual income of $4000 per animal per year. In In re Dean
the court held that any excess of the £750 not required for the care of the
28. 41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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horses and hounds should go to the life tenant of the freehold. In Security
Trust Co. v. Willett29 testatrix left $5000 in 1923 in trust, the net income
to be applied to the maintenance of certain family lots and tombstones
forever. Subsequently burial locations were changed with the result that
upkeep expense on the cemetery lots and tombstones became about $10
per year. In September 1952 the trust fund amounted to $15,000 with an
annual income of $600. The court impressed a resulting trust in favor of
the estate of the testatrix of the excess proceeds. Thus, excessive funding
of honorary trusts should not result in the invalidity of the honorary trust,
but rather only the excess over the amount required to accomplish the
trust's purpose should be held on a resulting trust for the estate of the
testator.
The Restatement requires that honorary trusts comply with the rule
against perpetuities. Comment f states:
So also, where the devisee or legatee is authorized to apply the
property for the maintenance of one or more animals during the
lives of the animals, the provision is invalid since the period of
the rule against perpetuities is measured by lives of persons and
not lives of animals, whether or not the normal duration of the
life of the animal is shorter than that of a human being. Whether
in such cases the devisee or legatee can properly apply the prop-
erty for a period of twenty-one years, on the ground that the
annual payments are to be treated as separable, it not within the
scope of the Restatement of this Subject.
The reasons why bequests for the care of specific animals should not
be subject to the rule against perpetuities are advanced below. This does
not mean that an analogous rule should not be applied to such gifts. The
appropriate and proper rule should be that bequests for the care of
specific animals should be valid for the duration of the lives of the desig-
nated animals and for such period only. There is no indication that
American courts would adopt such a rule. Hence, wisdom indicates that
counsel in America drafting bequests for the care of specific animals
comply with the irrelevant and potentially purpose-defeating rule against
perpetuities.
B. New York
1. In General
The New York cases holding bequests for the care of specific animals
invalid are not only important in New York. They constitute a high per-
centage of the cases decided in all American jurisdictions on this issue.
29. 33 Del. Ch. 544, 97 A.2d 112 (1953).
1967-19681
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
They are important because they were decided under the then current
versions of the New York statutory scheme having its origins in the New
York Revised Statutes of 1830 which were widely adopted in other states
and still form the basis of the statutory schemes in many jurisdictions.
2. Statutory Provisions
Section 96 of the New York Real Property Law originally limited the
purposes for which express trusts of real property could be created to one
or more of the following purposes:
1. To sell real property for the benefit of creditors;
2. To sell, mortgage or lease real property for the benefit of
annuitants or other legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any
charge thereon;
3. To receive the rents and profits of real property and apply
them to the use of any person, during the life of that person, or
for any shorter term, subject to the provisions of law relating
thereto;
4. To receive the rents and profits of real property, and to ac-
cumulate the same for the purposes, and within the limits, pre-
scribed by law."
Under subsections 2 and 3 the annuitants, legatees, or beneficiaries
would have to be human beings. Hence devises of real property for the
care of specific animals were invalid."
The New York rule against perpetuities was traditionally the two lives
rule contained in section 11 of the Personal Property Law32 and section
30. No longer in force in New York. § 7-1.4 of the NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS AND
TRUSTS LAW provides: "An express trust may be created for any lawful purpose."
31. Trusts for the perpetual care of cemetaries were held invalid under this section.
In re Turk's Will, 128 Misc. 803, 221 N.Y.S. 225, appeal dismissed, 222 App. Div. 724, 226
N.Y.S. 111 (1927); Kahlmeyer v. Green-Wood Cemetery, 175 Misc. 187, 23 N.Y.S.2d 17,
modified on other grounds, 261 App. Div. 950, 27 N.Y.S.2d 446, reargument denied, 261 App.
Div. 1075, 27 N.Y.S.2d 1013, motion denied, 286 N.Y. 696, 37 N.E.2d 138, aff'd, 287 N.Y.
787, 40 N.E.2d 650 (1940).
32. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, § 11 (McKinney 1962). As originally enacted in
1909, § 11 of the Personal Property Law provided:
The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be suspended by any limita-
tion or condition, for a longer period than during the continuance and until the
termination of not more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument
containing such limitation or condition; or, if such instrument be a last will and
testament, for not more than two lives in being at the death of the testator. In other
respects limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject
to the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property.
33. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 42 (McKinney 1929). The section provides that:
The absolute power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being
by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. Every future estate shall
be void in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any
[Vol. 6:15
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42 of the Real Property Law.3 3 In Matter of Howells3 4 the court, in
defining the term "lives in being" found in the statutes, stated that it
referred to human lives, and that a trust may not be limited otherwise
than on human lives. New York now has adopted the common law rule
against perpetuities in section 9-1.1 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts
Law.35 The new New York rule against perpetuities does not appear to
alter the construction of "lives in being" under Matter of Howells.
For completeness it should be mentioned that the New York court held
charitable trusts invalid for indefiniteness after the adoption of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1830.6 As a result of the court's holding the Tilden Trust
invalid, charitable trusts were then authorized by statute in Section 113
of the Real Property Law and Section 12 of the Personal Property Law.
Section 8-1.1 (a) of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law carries forward
these statutory authorizations by providing that:
No disposition of property for religious, charitable, educational
or benevolent purposes, otherwise valid under 'the laws of this
state, is invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance
of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate; except that a
contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take
effect in the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited, die
under the age of twenty-one years, or on any other contingency by which the estate
of such persons may be determined before they attain full age. For the purposes
of this section, a minority is deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal
to the possible duration of such minority. Lives in being or a minority in being
shall include a child begotten before the creation of the estate but born thereafter.
34. 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (1932). See also Matter of Schaefer's Estate, 99
N.Y.S.2d 27 (1948); Matter of Murray's Will, 198 Misc. 45, 99 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1948); In re
Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1952).
35. N.Y. EPTL 1-1.1, § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1966), rule against perpetuities. The statute
provides:
(a) (1) The absolute power of alienation or the absolute ownership of property is
suspended, when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee or estate
in possession can be conveyed or transferred. (2) Every present or future estate
shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation
or the absolute ownership of property, by any limitation or condition, for a longer
period than lives in being at the creation of the estate and a term of not more than
twenty-one years. Lives in being shall include a child conceived before the creation
of the estate but born thereafter. In no case shall the lives measuring the permissible
period be so designated or so numerous as to make proof of their end unreasonably
difficult.
(b) No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the estate and
any period of gestation involved. In no case shall lives measuring the permissible
period of vesting be so designated or so numerous as to make proof of their end
unreasonably difficult.
36. Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880, 14 L.R.A. 33, reargument denied, 130
N.Y. 29, 29 N.E. 1033 (1891).
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the persons designated as beneficiaries. If a trustee is named in
the disposing instrument, legal title to the property transferred
for such a purpose vests in such trustee; if no person is named as
trustee, title vests in the court having jurisdiction over the trust.
Other states have similar statutes. It would be possible under this or simi-
lar statutes to conclude that bequests for the care of specific animals are
valid charitable bequests because the disposition is for a benevolent pur-
pose. As noted previously, such a conclusion was reached by the Kentucky
court in Willett v. Willett 7 in construing a similar statute. However, the
New York courts have given no indication that they would be likely to
adopt such a construction.
3. The New York Cases
(a) Honorary Trusts
The first of the New York cases involving the validity of a bequest for
the care of specific animals is In re Howells' Estate."8 The testatrix had
two cats and three dogs which she attempted to provide for by a trust com-
prised of the residue of her estate. 9 In the course of its opinion, the court
referred to In re Dean and the Irish case of In re Kelly,4" the latter for the
proposition that "lives in being" as the measuring yardstick for the rule
37. 197 Ky. 663, 247 S.W. 739 (1923).
38. 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (1932), modified, 146 Misc. 169, 261 N.Y.S. 859 (1933).
39. Fifth. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real, personal and
mixed, and wheresoever the same may be situate, and any usused balance of moneys
derived under Option No. 1 from the Teachers' Retirement System I give in trust
unto my Executor hereinafter named to and for the following uses and purposes:
To hold, invest and re-invest the principal thereof in such securities as are
permitted to Savings Banks in the State of New York, and to collect and receive the
income for the care, comfort and maintenance of my pet animals as my friends and
co-teachers, Elera Burck and Milison Dutrow shall direct and authorize. These
teachers have personally assured me that they would assume such responsibility.
I further authorize and empower and hereby direct my said Executor or the
successor Trustee of my estate to apply the balance of the income from my estate
to the care, comfort and maintenance of Charles E. Rattray and should conditions
arise during the lifetime of Charles E. Rattray which would bring about the need
of more income for his necessary care, comfort and maintenance, in addition to the
amount of income herein directed to be applied to or paid for his support, that then
and in such case my Executor or his successor Trustee of my estate is authorized
and directed to use such portion of the principal of said trust estate as is required
to amply provide for his care, comfort and maintenance.
Eighth. I authorize and empower my Executor or the successor Trustee of my
estate to retain any part or portion of my estate as long as he or she shall consider
it to be for the benefit of my estate to do so and to provide for the care of
my pet animals while they live.
In re Howells' Estate, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 601-02 (1932), modified, 146 Misc. 169,
261 N.Y.S. 859 (1933).
40. [1932] Ir. R. 255.
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against perpetuities must be human lives and not the lives of animals.4
Strictly speaking the court did not pass on this issue, however, as the court
stated that a trust limited on the lives of five animals and one human
being was undoubtedly in violation of the New York two lives rule. Like-
wise, the court was not required to base its decision on the language "apply
them [rents and profits of real property] to the use of any person" of
Subsection 3 of Section 96 of the Real Property Law. This was because
the language of the will did not permit the construction that the principal
was to be divided into separate portions for each animal and the human
beneficiary.
The next New York case involving the validity of a trust for the care
and burial of testatrix's pets was In re Mills' Estate." In her will the
testatrix provided:
Fifth: I direct my Executor to set aside a sum sufficient to
produce at least One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per annum, the
income to be used for the proper care of any pet or pets I may
possess at the time of my death, and to be paid to whosoever may
be entrusted with their care, and I prefer that this care be en-
trusted to the New York Women's League for Animals, 325
Lafayette Street, New York City, New York. At the death of all
the pets the principal and accrued interest, if any, to be given to
the New York Women's League for Animals, New York City,
New York. The burial of any pet or pets to be in Hartsdale Ca-
nine Cemetery, Hartsdale, New York, where I own a plot; and
for the care in perpetuity of said plot I leave to it, another One
Hundred ($100.00) Dollars, the income to be devoted solely
thereto .4
3
However, testatrix's pets all died between the date of her death and the
probate of the will. Under the circumstances the trust fund never had to be
set aside and no claims appear to have been advanced for sums spent on
cat food before the death of the pets. Nevertheless, the court followed the
reasoning in Matter of Howells' Estate that the attempted trust failed
because it violated both the New York rule against perpetuities and sec-
tion 96 of the Real Property Law which limited the purposes for which
an express trust of real property might be created 44 because both statutes
employed the word "persons." The court then continued:
41. Quoting from Robinson v. Hardcastle, 29 Eng. Rep. 11, 15 (Ch. 1786). "Lord
Thurlow defined a perpetuity in these words: 'What is a perpetuity, but the extending the
estate beyond a life in being, and twenty-one years after?' Of course by 'a life' he means
lives; and there can be no doubt that 'lives' means lives of human beings, not of animals or
trees in California."
42. 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1952).
43. Id., at 624.
44. § 96 of the REAL PROPERTY LAW was also applied to trusts of personal property.
1967-1968]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
With respect to the legacy of $100 to the Hartsdale Canine
Cemetery the validity of which is questioned by one of the resid-
uary legatees, the court directs the administrator c.t.a. to submit
proof concerning the capacity of said Cemetery to take and
whether the testatrix owned a plot therein at her death.45
If these two conditions were met, the bequest for the perpetual care of
the cats' graves would be valid under statutes authorizing dispositions of
property in trust for the perpetual care and maintenance of private burial
plots in cemeteries.46 While the legal logic for holding a trust for the care
of a live cat invalid and a bequest [the statute authorizes a trust] for the
perpetual care of the grave of the same cat valid, is unimpeachable, never-
theless, the resulting inversion of all normal and decent values, renders
these results suspect.
(b) Gifts Upon a Condition
Since honorary trusts for the care and maintenance of animals were
invalid in New York (and probably would still be invalid under the older
New York cases' constructions of language carried over into the present
New York rule against perpetuities (Section 9-1.1 of the Estates, Powers
and Trusts Law), testatrixes desiring to provide for the care of their pets
after their death must use other legal devices to accomplish this purpose.
In In re Murray's Estate47 the court construed a bequest to a person
for use in providing for the care of decedent's cat as a bequest on a condi-
tion rather than as an attempted creation of an invalid trust. The court
stated that since the condition was the motive of the bequest, the bequest
could be properly paid to the legatee if the cat was in existence at the date
of the death of the decedent. The court appeared to be taking the position
that the existence of the cat at the testatrix's death was a condition prece-
dent to the validity of the bequest.
In In re Johnson's Estate48 testatrix's will provided:
Seventh: I give and bequeath to Harris A. Stanford, of Sara-
toga Springs, New York, now in my employ, my two riding
mares known as "Bessie" and "Daisy," respectively, together
with all saddles, harness and equipment owned by me and used
in connection with said mares at the time of my decease together
with the sum of Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.). My
Robinson v. Adams, 81 App. Div. 20, 80 N.Y.S. 1098 (1903), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 558, 71 N.E.
1139 (1904).
45. 111 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
46. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 114-a (McKinney 1945) and PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 13-a
(McKinney 1962), now ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.5 (McKinney 1967).
47. 99 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1948).
48. 302 N.Y. 782, 98 N.E.2d 895 (1951).
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wish and direction is that the said Harris A. Stanford apply the
said sum of Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.), and the
income, if any, arising from the same, to the care and mainte-
nance of the said two (2) mares, according to his judgment and
without restriction.
Testatrix was declared incompetent and her committee disposed of the
horses and equipment before her death. There were facts indicating that
the testatrix might have intended to benefit the legatee and not merely
benefit the horses. The Surrogate, following In Re Murray's Estate, held
the bequest was a gift on a condition and failed but the decision was
reversed on appeal.
In In re Andrew's Will 49 testatrix's will provided:
Thirteenth: I give to Lucretia Shaffer $500.00, but as a condi-
tion of the legacy, require her to give my dog good care as long
as the dog lives.
Nineteenth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my prop-
erty I direct shall be divided between the legatees named in this
will who survive me pro-rated on a basis of their respective
legacy. By that I mean that a person who has a legacy for
$1000.00 would get twice as much as a person who gets a legacy
for $500.00.
the dog mentioned in the will was destroyed by the testatrix prior to
her death. Thus, the question for the court was whether the proper inter-
pretation of the language of Article 13 was that of a condition precedent
or subsequent. Since testatrix knew of the destruction of the dog and did
not change her will and she did not employ language such as "if the dog
be living at my death," the court held that the condition was a condition
subsequent and hence Lucretia Shaffer was entitled to the specific bequest
and to share in the residue.
The following bequest was made by the testatrix in In re Filkins' Will: 50
I give, devise and bequeath to Lottie E. Filkins, widow of
my deceased brother Clarence G. Filkins, whatever automobile
I may own at the time of my decease and my residence where
I now reside, including all of the land and outbuildings as well
as all furniture, household furnishings and housekeeping appli-
ances in the house, and I direct that she shall have the right to
use and occupy said premises immediately upon my death. This
bequest and devise, however, are made expressly contingent
upon the said Lottie E. Filkins furnishing proper care for any
49. 228 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1962).
50. 120 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (1952).
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and all pets which I may own at the time of my decease for as
long as they shall live.
The court in a very concise opinion wrote:
The first sentence of said paragraph contains a positive, abso-
lute bequest and devise. The provisions of the last sentence were
meant by testatrix to be performed by the beneficiary, Lottie
E. Filkins, during her enjoyment of her bequest and devise.
Hence the provision is not a condition precedent but is a condi-
tion subsequent ...
The vested interests of Lottie E. Filkins in said bequest and
devise continue, subject to divestment only upon the occurrence
or enforcement of a legal invalidating condition ...
Since the condition is based upon the lives of several animals,
it clearly is void under the statute against unlawful suspension
of the power of alienation. . . Moreover, there is no gift over
in the event of failure to perform the condition, and hence the
condition cannot operate to disturb the vested interests of Lottie
E. Filkins.
It would thus appear that gifts on condition that the legatee or devisee
care for animals will not effectuate the testatrix's purpose in New York.
The condition itself is invalid. If the condition is construed as a condition
subsequent, the legatee or devisee will take the gift absolutely and free
of the condition. If the existence of the animal at the date of decedent's
death is construed as a condition precedent to the validity of the devise
or bequest and the animal predeceases the testatrix, the gift will fail.
Hence gifts on a condition are no more effective than absolute gifts to
the legatee accompanied by precatory language expressing the testatrix's
desire that the animal be cared for. They are legally unenforceable and
the actual care of the pets rests upon the moral character and sense of
duty and obligation of the legatee. However, it should be noted that as
a practical matter this is also true in jurisdictions which uphold such
bequests as honorary trusts. The actual accomplishment of the testatrix's
intention in states recognizing honorary trusts is dependent upon the
donee of the power's personal willingness to perform. Indeed, in the sense
that the unwillingness of the donee of the power to perform the honorary
trust results in the passing of the property to the testatrix's estate, an
honorary trust is merely a condition subsequent which the courts will
enforce.
There is one practical difference in New York between attempting to
create an invalid trust for the care of specific animals and an invalid
condition subsequent for the same purpose. When the trust is declared
invalid, the property passes to the testatrix's estate and ultimately to
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parties who may feel under less of an obligation to care for the animals
than the trustee would have felt. When the condition subsequent is de-
clared invalid, the devisee or legatee holds the property absolutely and
free of the condition; but the devisee or legatee was presumably selected
by the testatrix as a person willing to care for the animal.
C. Other Jurisdictions
1. Honorary Trusts
The only American case directly upholding the validity of an honorary
trust for the care of a specific animal is In re Searight's Estate.5 ' In that
case the testator directed $1000 to be set aside for the care of his dog
to be expended for this purpose at a rate of 750 per day.52 The court
quoted the Restatement of Trusts, Section 124 and Scott's treatise on
the subject and concluded: "Whether called an 'honorary trust' or what-
ever terminology is used, we conclude that the bequest for the care of
the dog, Trixie, is not in and of itself unlawful." The court adopted the
Restatement of the Law of Property definition of the rule against per-
petuities in Section 374 which permits a maximum absolute period of
21 years. Since the $1000 principal plus all interest would have to be
expended long before the period of 21 years expired, the court found
the bequest did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
The court held that the Ohio succession tax could not be levied against
the funds expended in carrying out the honorary trust since Trixie was
not a person. This part of the decision may arguably be incorrect. Trixie
became the property of Florence Hand. The older American slave cases
held that property acquired by the slave belonged to the master.5 3 By
analogy, the property should have been held to be that of Florence Hand
and hence taxable, particularly since Trixie was now Florence's dog and
but for the trust fund she would have to pay for the dog's care out of
her own funds.
In Richberg v. Robbins54 the court upheld the probate of the following
will which had been denied probate by the Probate Court on the grounds
that a dog cannot be made a legatee.
51. 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E.2d 779 (1950).
52. Id., at 418, 95 N.E.2d at 780. The testator provided that:
I give and bequeath my dog, Trixie, to Florence Hand of Wooster, Ohio, and I
direct my executor to deposit in the Peoples Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Wooster, Ohio, the sum of $1000.00 to be used by him to pay Florence Hand at
the rate of 75 cents per day for the keep and care of my dog as long as it shall live.
If my dog shall die before the said $1000.00 and the interest accruing therefrom
shall have been used up, I give and bequeath whatever remains of said $1000.00
to be divided equally among those of the following persons who are living at that
time, to wit: Bessie Immler, Florence Hand, Reed Searight, Fern Olson and Willis
Horn. Id.
53. See generally 58 C.J. Slaves § 14 (1932).
54. 33 Tenn. App. 66, 228 S.W.2d 1019 (1950). See 21 TENN. L. RaV. 678 (1951).
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I, Gerald S. Richberg do on this seventh day of December
1947 will all my earthly possessions to my dog of which is an
American Pit Bull female. Black with white spot in breast.
Named Dixie. After all my burial and hospital expenses (if any)
are taken care of and Clay Robbins of 194 S. Somerville, Mem-
phis, Tennessee to be administrator. This being written at my
request and signed in the presence of each. And $40.00 per
month to be the amount spent for the dog's care.
In upholding probate the court said:
We find it unnecessary to decide the interesting question
whether a dog may be a legatee for the reason that the language
of the instrument taken as a whole raises the question whether
there was an attempt to bequeath property to the dog or an
attempt to set up a private trust for the care of a specific ani-
mal, for which latter supporting authority will be found in Page
on Wills (3d Ed.) Section 1193, citing In re Dean, L.R. 41 Ch.
Div. 552; Willett v. Willett, 197 Ky. 663, 247 S.W. 739, 31
A.L.R. 426.
It is a matter of construction of the will which is not a proper
issue in probate proceedings. Jones v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 237, 43
S.W.2d 205; Condry v. Coffey, 163 Tenn. 508, 43 S.W.2d 928."5
One can only speculate on the basis of this language that honorary trusts
for the care of specific animals will be upheld in Tennessee.
In New England Trust Co. v. Folsom56 testatrix provided for the
establishment of a trust with the power to invade corpus "for the board-
ing during their respective lifetimes of such cats as may be owned by me
at the time of my death." The court did not pass on or even indicate its
opinion of the validity of this trust as the issue before the court was the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix which the court held under the
circumstances to be a question for a jury.
In the Pennsylvania cases of In re Renner's Estate57 the lower court
found an honorary trust on the following language:
Fifth: I give, devise and bequeath unto my good friend, Mary
Faiss Riesing, my home and garage at No. 1324 N. Marston
Street, Philadelphia, together with the entire contents thereof,
including my pets and my flower garden, absolutely.
Sixth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real
and personal, of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situate, I
55. 33 Tenn. App. at 68, 228 S.W.2d at 1021.
56. 268 Mass. 342, 167 N.E. 665 (1929).
57. 358 Pa. 409, 57 A.2d 836 (1948), aff'g 59 D & C 102 (1947). See 10 U. Pir. L. REv.
102 (1948).
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give, devise and bequeath unto my executrix, hereinafter named,
IN TRUST, however, for the maintenance of my pets, which I
leave to her kind care and judgment, and for their interment
upon their respective deaths in the Francisvale Cemetery. Upon
the death and interment of the last of my pets to survive, I give,
devise and bequeath my entire residue estate so held in trust
unto the said Mary Faiss Riesing, absolutely and in fee.58
The court concluded that the estate of Mary Faiss Riesing vested in the
residue immediately. Hence, under the doctrine of acceleration, even if
the appellant niece and nephew were correct that an honorary trust for
the care of specific animals were invalid, they would still have no interest
in the residue. While it was not necessary to the court's decision, the
court did declare:
We all agree that the estate vested in the legatee at testator's
death. His will meant that she should take the residue from that
time; he wished her to apply as much as she considered neces-
sary to the care of the pets and to retain the rest for her own use.
There was no trust in the sense in which that term is used in
courts of equity in this Commonwealth. The entire estate, legal
and equitable, passed to the legatee. There was no cestui que
trust who could call her to account. There was no charitable
trust. She owed no enforceable duty to anyone. If she had pre-
deceased the testator, no successor could have exercised "her
kind care and judgment," which was what testator desired.59
It would thus appear that honorary trusts for the care of specific animals
are invalid in Pennsylvania.
In In re McNeill's Estate6" testatrix provided that the residue of her
estate should be divided into three separate trusts for the care of two
dogs and one cat. Each trustee was authorized to withdraw $25 per week
for each pet entrusted to her to be used for the pet's care, maintenance
and support. If this sum should prove insufficient, the trustees were
authorized to use so much more as in their discretion should be necessary
for the purpose. On the other hand, should the stipulated stipend be more
than adequate, the trustees are to retain the surplus in consideration of
their services. The will stated: "The primary purpose of this Trust is to
see that each of said pets is adequately cared for, given proper veterinary
attention and given a decent burial at the time of their death."6' Upon
the death of each pet the trust was to terminate and the remainder, in-
cluding accumulated income, was to be distributed to the Society for the
58. 358 Pa. at 411, 57 A.2d at 837.
59. Id., at 413, 57 A.2d at 838.
60. 41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
61. Id., at 140.
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, one-half to the Los Angeles branch
and one-half to the San Francisco branch. The residue exceeded $300,000.
The probate court held the residuary trust void, accelerated the re-
mainder, and ordered distribution to the two SPCA organizations. Neither
the trustees nor the charities appealed. The report does not indicate what
the two dogs and the cat said or did. This is, of course, the practical reason
for requiring a cestui que trust in those instances where neither the
Attorney General nor the court by appointment of a guardian ad litem
will take steps to enforce the testator's intentions. It is, however, not a
valid reason why the courts should not appoint guardians ad litem in such
cases. In the analagous slave cases the courts would appoint a guardian
for a slave when he claimed his freedom although a slave could not nor-
mally be a party to a civil action.62
2. Conditions
In In re Bradley's Estate63 testatrix left the residue of her estate to
her housekeeper with the direction:64 "she must [italics in report] take
good care of my dear cats, Sister, Daddy Bimbow, Jimmy John and
Tricksey." The court found this language precatory since:
. . . it is apparent that the testatrix intended that she should
benefit from the bequest. By no known process of reasoning
can the language be made to mean that any certain sum or part
of the bequest was intended for the cats, and therefore the
direction to take good care of the cats, although imperatively
worded, imposed no obligation except as it may appeal to the
discretion and good will of Mrs-. Peterson; in other words, the
testatrix relied upon her dear friend and companion to comply
with her request, or command, to care for her cats.65
In Betts v. Snyder66 the testator in a will probated in 1895 gave a life
estate in land to his widow, followed by life estates in his brother and
62. 58 C.J. Slaves § 18 (1932).
63. 59 P.2d 1129 (Wash. 1936).
64. Id., at 1131. The testatrix provided that:
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, of whatsoever character,
real, personal or mixed, being and remaining after payment of the specific bequests
hereinbefore set forth, I give, devise and bequeath unto my dear friend and com-
panion Hattie M. Peterson of Aberdeen, Washington, and further direct that during
the period of probate of my estate that the executor of this my last will and testa-
ment give to the said Hattie M. Peterson the use and occupancy of my home and
that reasonable allowance be made for her for the care thereof during that period;
she must take good care of my dear cats, Sister, Daddy Bimbow, Jimmy John and
Tricksey. Id.
65. Id., at 1131.
66. 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941).
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sister-in-law with the "remainder to Joshua Beans and Mary Beans
(Palmer) or to the survivor of them and their heirs of such survivor
forever," subject to innumerable limitations on the use of the property67
which, if violated, the title of the violator was to be forfeited and his title
would then vest in the Pennsylvania SPCA or its successors. 68 The estate
was subject to a charge in favor of testator's favorite horse, Charlie.
All the life tenants had died, the SPCA had released all its interest to
the Beans and Palmer. The latter conveyed the premises free and clear
of all limitations and conditions to defendant's predecessors in interest.
Plaintiff alleged that the breach of conditions contained in the will com-
bined with release of its interest by SPCA resulted in title vesting in heirs
at law of testator Joshua Beans.
While it is not mentioned in the decision, it is assumed that faithful
old Charlie had also departed for the happy grazing pasture. As to the
possible breach of the other conditions, the court found that the language
was not that of a fee simple determinable. Hence, the gift over would
have to be an executory devise since it followed the gift of the absolute
fee. The violation of the rule against perpetuities would not invalidate
the prior estates unless the prior and ulterior estates were so intimately
dependent that to uphold the former without the latter would defeat the
dominant purpose of the testator. Since this was held not to be the case,
the executory devise was invalid but the prior remainder was valid.
67. The will provided that all of the estates thus created should be subject to the support
of testator's favorite horse, Charlie, that Charlie should at all times be kindly treated, that
no cruelty of any kind to animals should ever be tolerated on that farm, that no part
of the timber growing on the farm should ever be removed except as dead timber was
replaced by young walnut trees, that the burial ground of testator's favorite horses was
never to be ploughed over or disturbed in any way, that the farm buildings should be
retained in good repair and never taken down unless they should fall down or be destroyed
by fire, and that the farm wagons and sleds should be maintained forever in the wagon
houses. He also provided that such of his books as his wife and sister did not desire should be
taken with the bookcases that once belonged to his father and placed on the second floor of
the dwelling house on the farm, there to be kept and remain forever for the use of his kindred
and their descendants and for the use of the people in the neighborhood within the radius of
one mile. In addition, the will stated: "And it is further my will that intoxication shall not
at any time be allowed upon my said farm or plantation and that intoxicating liquors of any
nature or kind shall ever be taken or used thereon as a beverage. All these conditions I
earnestly and emphatically enjoin." Id., at 466, 19 A.2d at 83.
68. Id., at 467, 19 A.2d at 83. The testator further provided:
And these conditions not being in restraint of alienation, but subject thereto, it is
my will that they shall be observed forever, and that any owner or tenant who shall
at any time disregard, fail to observe or nullify, then shall forfeit his or her title
to the said farm or plantation, and the same shall then rest in the Corporation
known as 'The Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals' and
its Successors forever, who shall use and enjoy it in advancing the cause of humanity
to the animal creation. Id.
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D. Charitable Trusts
1. In General
Charitable trusts were accepted as part of the common law in most
American jurisdictions. In a few they had to be authorized by statute.69
Even in states with statutes authorizing charitable trusts, what consti-
tutes a charitable purpose has been treated more as a matter of common
law than a matter of interpretation of statutory language. The statutes
commonly use the phrase "religious, charitable, educational or benevo-
lent" or similar language which is broader than the older English case
definition of a charitable trust."
The Restatement of Trusts, Second, Section 368, states that charitable
purposes include:
(a) the relief of poverty;
(b) the advancement of education;
() the advancement of religion;
(d) the promotion of health;
(e) governmental or municipal purposes;
(f) other purposes the accomplishment- of which is beneficial
to the community.
In addition, Comment C of Section 374 of the Restatement of Trusts,
Second, states:
A trust to prevent or alleviate the suffering of animals is char-
itable. Thus, a trust for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or
a trust to establish a home for animals, or a trust for the pre-
vention or cure or treatment of diseases or of injuries to animals,
is charitable.
Section 374 of the Restatement of Trusts, Second, requires that the pur-
pose to be promoted by the trust must be sufficiently beneficial to the
community to justify the dedication of property forever to this purpose."'
Though a discussion of the refusal of the courts to apply a time limitation
on charitable trusts analogous to the rule against perpetuities which is
applied to private trusts is beyond the scope of this article, it should be
noted that it is impossible for charitable trusts to last forever; and hence
the validity of a trust for any purpose should not be judged by such a
standard. However, the courts while mentioning this strict standard, do
not actually apply it. Thus trusts for the benefit and care of animals in
69. 4 SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 348.3 (2d ed. 1956).
70. See Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (Ch. 1805).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUiSTS § 374 (1959). Section 374 states: "A trust for the
promotion of purposes which are of a character sufficiently beneficial to the community to
justify permitting property to be devoted forever to their accomplishment is charitable."
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general are almost universally upheld.72 Occasionally a specific trust is
objected to because it is argued it would not benefit the community or
might operate to the benefit of animals harmful to man.7' A trust for the
rearing and releasing of rattlesnakes and cobras in suburban parks would
undoubtedly be invalid; but sane testators don't establish such trusts.
2. Trusts for the Benefit of Specific Animals
The case law construing charitable trusts requires that in order to be
charitable a gift must be for the benefit of a sufficiently large or indefinite
class.74 This means that the settlor is not permitted to select the indi-
viduals who will benefit from the trust and still have that trust upheld
as a charitable trust and hence not limited in duration by the rule against
perpetuities. The power to designate the individuals to receive the benefits
of the trust must rest in the trustee. Of course, the settlor may be the
trustee of an inter vivos trust, but not of a testamentary trust.
The principle that indefinite membership in the class from which the
ultimate beneficiary of the trust is to be selected in order for a gift to
be charitable is violated by construing words such as "benevolent" or
"humane" in statutes authorizing charitable trusts as permitting trusts
for the care of specific animals. In Willett v. Willett75 the testatrix left
$1000 to support and care for her dog "Dick."7 6 In upholding the validity
of this trust under the Kentucky statute,77 the court stated:
72. See, e.g., In re Siemens' Estate, 346 Pa. 610, 31 A.2d 280 (1943) ; Towne Estate, 75
Pa. D. & C. 215 (1950); Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 (1935); In re Hamilton's
Will, 270 App. Div. 634, 63 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1946).
73. In re Grove-Grady [1928] 1 Ch. 557.
74. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 375 (1959). The Section states: "A trust is
not a charitable trust if the persons who are to benefit are not of a sufficiently large or
indefinite class so that the community is interested in the enforcement of the trust."
75. 197 Ky. 663, 247 S.W. 739 (1923).
76. Id., at 664, 247 S.W. at 739. The testamentary language follows:
I write this as my last will. I give my sister, Mrs. Minnie Willett everything that
I have at my death for her life, at her death it is to go to the Hopewell Church for
a fund to be known as the "Quincy Burgess Fund" to be used for the church, with
the exception of $1,000, which is to be used for the support of our dog "Dick," if
the interest is not sufficient for him to be kept in comfort, that is being well fed,
have a bed in the house by a fire and treated well every day, that the principal
be used to such a sum so it will last his lifetime.
I also give Mrs. Belilah Stevens $100 for being kind to me when I needed it.
Dicky must have three meals daily. Id.
77. All grants, conveyances, devises, gifts, * * * heretofore made, or which shall be
hereafter made, in due form of law, or any lands, tenements, rents, * * * money,
* * * for the relief or benefit of aged or impotent and poor people, * * * or for
any other charitable or humane purpose, shall be valid, if the grant, conveyance,
device, gift, appointment, or assignment shall point out, with reasonable certainty,
the purposes of the charity and the beneficiaries thereof, except as hereinafter re-
stricted.
Id., at 665, 247 S.W. at 740 citing KENTUCKY STATUTE § 317, now KRS § 381.260 (1963).
1967-19681
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
While the devise did not create a charity in its strict technical
sense, it was for a "humane purpose" within the meaning of
our said Statutes.
There is a clear distinction between a "charity" and a
"humane purpose." The latter may be sustained where the for-
mer would fail. Charity extends to every one of a class, while
it is a humane purpose which moves a person to take care of
or feed a single hungry person, bird, or dog. 8
As long as such interpretation of a statute does not include freeing the
gift from every limitation in duration, the result is probably desirable.
However, it is doubtful that this decision will be followed in other juris-
dictions.
3. Preferences
There is a substantial body of case law which upholds the validity of
trusts as charitable trusts even though by the terms of the trust a prefer-
ence should be given to designated persons in selecting those who are to
benefit directly from the trust.79 Analytically such terms merely engraft
a private trust onto a charitable trust. Hence, if the provision for the
descendants of the settlor or other similar provisions violate the rule
against perpetuities, it should be held invalid. Only if the dominant pur-
pose of the testator were to provide for his descendants within the frame-
work of the charitable trust would the charitable trust itself fail. It is
doubtful that the courts would often find such a noncharitable dominant
intention. However, the courts have not adopted this approach to such
preferential terms in charitable trusts.
In In re Forrester's Estate8° the testator left property to the Colorado
State Board of Child and Animal Protection requesting that it be used
in perpetuity for the relief of animals in Colorado and especially request-
ing "that my dog Shep (if living) be given every care and a good home
during his life and a decent burial upon his passing."" The court held
78. Id., at 666, 247 S.W. at 740.
79. Brand v. Earl of Devon, L.R. 3 Ch. 800 (1868); Tarver v. Weaver, 221 Ala. 663,
130 So. 209 (1930) ; Dexter v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57
N.E. 371 (1900); In re MacDowell's Will, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916); Common-
wealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Granger, 57 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Pa. 1944); Stewart's
Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 526 (1943). See ANNOT., 131 A.L.R. 1277 (1941) for a discussion of
provisions for relief or education of member of family or relatives as creating a charitable
trust.
80. 86 Colo. 221, 279 P. 721 (1929).
81. Id., at 222, 279 P. at 722. The testator further provided:
Ninth: Should I be unmarried at the time of my death I give and bequeath all the
balance of my estate (after my just debts are paid) of every name and nature, and
description, consisting of real estate in Denver, and Pueblo and Adams County,
Colorado, moneys and bonds in banks in Denver, personal effects, my insurance
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this language was merely precatory and did not result in the invalidity
of the bequest. Though it was not in issue, it appears that the court
regarded this language as unenforceable.
The holding of bequests for the care of specific animals valid as char-
itable trusts would seem desirable because this would make the intention
of the testator enforceable. Testators really do not intend that such be-
quests may be defeated by a trustee who is unwilling to perform as is the
case when the bequests are held to be honorary trusts or when the lan-
guage is held to be an invalid condition.
The substantial objection to such a holding is that it would free the
gift from compliance with the rule against perpetuities. There is no rea-
son, however, why the courts could not develop a rule analogous to the
rule against perpetuities to limit the permissible duration of such gifts
to the lives of specifically designated animals in being at the time of the
testator's death.
IV. CONCLUSION
Honorary trusts for the benefit of specific animals are valid in England,
Ohio, Kentucky and probably Tennessee. They have been invalid in New
York and California and are probably invalid in Pennsylvania. The lan-
guage of testators directing or requesting their pets to be cared for has
generally not been enforced. Either the language is construed as precatory
or the condition is held invalid.
Despite the almost universal approval of legal scholarship, it does not
appear that there is any judicial trend toward upholding the validity of
bequests for specific animals, let alone providing for judicial enforcement
of the intention of the testator that his pets be properly provided for after
his death.
business (which should be sold to the highest bidder) all I give and bequeath to
the Colorado State Board of Child and Animal Protection (E. K. Whitehead Secy.
at this date) requesting it to use the same in perpetuity, in affording relief to
hungry, thirsty, abused and neglected cattle, horses, dogs and cats in Denver, and
in Colorado at large, and to use the income, or the principal at its discretion, in
prosecuting those who neglect animals or who abuse them. I request that three (3)
iron drinking fountains for animals be erected in downtown Denver, the City of
Denver having been niggardly and selfish in that respect; I especially request that
my dog Shep (if living) be given every care and a good home during his life and a
decent burial upon his passing. Any person may be proud of this dog's friendship.
No part of my estate is to be spent upon human beings (except as specifically stated
herein) nor upon, or for the so-called Juvenile Court of Denver. Should the said
State Board of Child and Animal Protection be legislated out of business, or be
superseded by another institution of its kind, whether state or private, then this
bequest is to go to its successor. I request the Home Savings and Trust Company and
Frank L. Bishop of Denver, to act as my Executor, in connection with the State of
Colorado, the latter being the principal beneficiary hereunder. (The State Board of
Child and Animal Protection being at this date a State institution.)
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There appears to be no substantial objection to bequests for the care
of specific animals on grounds of social policy. Compulsory accounting
by trustees of such testamentary trusts could provide for their perfor-
mance in view of the lack of a cestui que trust capable of raising objec-
tions to the trustee's conduct. Since the public policy reasons behind the
rule against perpetuities are not applicable to such bequests, the rule
should be held inapplicable; and an analogous limitation on the duration
of such trusts should be developed measured on the animal "beneficiary's"
life.
